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Abstract 
[Excerpt] A not-so-funny thing happened on the way to the global economy. Mexico, the bright, new star in 
the investors' heaven, crashed as spectacularly as a meteor in December last year. By June, two million 
jobs had been lost, wages had declined bv 50-60 percent in dollar value, and 83 banks and some 80 
percent of small businesses were headed for bankruptcy[...] 
The crash serves as a case study in the workings - and failings - of the world economic system. It also 
needs to serve as a wake-up call to labor. Armed with an understanding of the world economic scene, 
labor needs to develop adequate responses to capital's efforts to maximize profits by moving investment 
capital from one country to another in the blink of an eye - or more accurately, at the touch of a finger on a 
keyboard. 
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Buying Time or 
Building a Future 
Labor Strategies for a 
Global Economy 
• Phoris Horvey 
A not-so-funny thing happened on the way to the global economy. Mex-
ico, the bright, new star in the investors' heaven, crashed as spectacu-
larly as a meteor in December last year. By June, two million jobs had been lost, 
wages had declined bv 50-60 percent in dollar value, and 83 banks and 
some 80 percent of small businesses were headed for bankruptcy. 
The reverberations from Mexico's crash were felt around the world 
- at the World Bank, at national banks, on the stock market, and at cor-
porations. Of course, it was not only corporations and monetary insti-
tutions that were affected by the crisis in Mexico. Because we are all 
part of one economy, troubles in Mexico quickly spread to increase the 
vulnerability of workers and communities elsewhere. 
In the U.S., investors felt the impact first and rushed to get govern-
mental relief, which was soon forthcoming in the form of a $20 billion 
bailout to Mexico. However, workers in the U.S. affected by the Mex-
ican crisis are getting no relief at all. In fact, quite the opposite is hap-
pening. The Mexican crisis has heightened pressure on labor negotiators 
and organizers, who were alreadv feeling the weight of NAFTA-related 
job losses and bargaining constraints. The cause is twofold. Mexico, 
already a cheap wage haven for U.S. investors, suddenly has become twice 
• Pharis Harvey is the executive director of the International Labor Rights Education and 
Research Fund. 
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as cheap. But equally devastating, Mexico's small middle-class, the 
"emerging market" of the pro-NAFTA forces' dreams, has suddenly 
evaporated as a potential target for U.S. exports. 
The crash serves as a case study in the workings - and failings - of 
the world economic system. It also needs to serve as a wake-up call to 
labor. Armed with an understanding of the world economic scene, labor 
needs to develop adequate responses to capital's efforts to maximize 
profits by moving investment capital from one country to another in 
the blink of an eye - or more accurately, at the touch of a finger on a 
keyboard. 
MEXICO'S CRASH - A CASE STUDY 
What happened in Mexico City on December 20, 1994 had in fact 
been coming since 1982 and reflected the 'structural adjustment poli-
cies7 that the IMF had been forcing on Third World countries every-
where. In 1982, Mexico nearly defaulted on its foreign debt and was forced 
to undergo structural adjustment - privatization, devaluation, deregu-
lation of labor and investment markets, and protection of intellectual 
property rights. It was a recipe specifically designed to maximize the 
advantage to foreign investors of a country's vulnerability during a for-
eign credit crisis. 
In Mexico, the IMF found a ready ally in Carlos Salinas de Gortari, 
a Harvard-trained finance minister ('82-'88) who became Mexico's pres-
ident in 1988. His mandate from the international financiers included 
the following measures: 
• a program of wage restraint which lowered the average wage value 
by 50 percent in the first three years. 
• systematic weakening of the political and economic clout of the 
corporatist "official" labor unions and peasant organizations which 
had been the primary source of the Mexican government's power 
over development 
• revoking of the constitutionally mandated ejido land system that 
had barred outright sale of land and kept it available for village-
level distribution 
• a massive sell-off of state enterprises (mostly to Salinas' cronies, 
who are now Mexico's 24 newly-minted billionaires) 
• the lifting of many restrictions on foreign direct investment and repa-
triation of portfolio investment capital (On January 1, 1994, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA - codified the 
relaxation of these restrictions.) 
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These changes made it easier and more attractive for U.S. investors 
to move their money into and out of Mexico without concern for national 
borders. Much of this investment activity happened through the stock 
market, where traders "played the market" by buying and selling stocks 
of Mexican companies. Billions of dollars of portfolio investment flowed 
into Mexico, turning the country into a giant casino for foreign players 
(and their newly-rich domestic partners). The rapid influx of dollars 
into Mexico sustained an artificially high value of the peso. Investors 
were "betting" on the future of post-NAFTA Mexico, temporarily ignor-
ing the reality of the Mexican economy. 
Unfortunately, the reality of the Mexican economy in 1994 was not 
as rosy as the imagined picture of its future. Sixty-six percent of Mex-
icans lived below the poverty line (up from 48.5 percent in 1982). And 
while one million workers entered the job market each year (and con-
tinue to do so), employment generation was also stalling. In the decade 
from 1982-1992, only 1.7 million jobs were created (down from 8.7 mil-
lion jobs created between 1972-1982). Why did these social problems 
continue to grow while foreign money was flowing into the country? Because 
most of the money that flowed into Mexico was not invested in the 
productive sector. The money was used by the upper and middle classes 
to purchase imports from the U.S. and other countries. 
The flow of easy money, however, lulled the government into the 
belief that its development strategy was successful. To keep the dollars 
flowing - and to aid the government's re-election in 1994 - the foreign 
exchange rate was kept high. Rather than risk inflation and the loss of 
foreign dollars by gradually devaluing the peso in 1994, Salinas insisted 
on locking the exchange rate to an unrealistic level. 
The inflated peso appeased the middle class with artificial and tem-
porary prosperity that enabled them to buy imported luxury goods. Sali-
nas hoped that the prosperity of the middle class would also encourage 
the poor to identify upward - imagining they too might reap the ben-
efits of Mexico's new-found prosperity. It might have been a good 
re-election strategy for the PRI, Salinas' party; however, for the coun-
try it made for disastrous economic consequences. 
To the millions disinherited by these policies the government fed 
continued promises of future prosperity, but it was thin gruel indeed. 
By December last year, as the new Zedillo administration came into power, 
the fiction was no longer sustainable. Suddenly, it all fell apart. The 
peso lost half its value in a matter of a few weeks; investment dollars 
fled the country by the billions; inflation soared; credit became impos-
sibly expensive for all but the most powerfully connected; and the mid-
dle class began to melt away. 
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Opponents of NAFTA in the U.S. and Mexico felt vindicated that 
their unheeded warnings about Mexico's unstable economic and polit-
ical system had in fact proven accurate. But there was little comfort in 
being right. 
The same American workers whose jobs were endangered by NAF-
TA's pressure to shift production southward are the taxpayers who now 
have to pay to bail out those wayward investors. And on the other side 
of the equation, American workers are also directly hurt by the loss of 
Mexico as a market. The collapse of Mexico's economy immediately hurt 
prospects for U.S.-made goods and services and caused a sudden increase 
in the trade deficit. 
Only 535 NAFTA related jobs were created 
whereas 40,000 workers have filed for NAFTA 
Transitional Adjustment Assistance due to job loss. 
So from every side, the Mexican disaster was a disaster for American 
workers. Auto sales to Mexico virtually stopped. Wal-Mart and other 
merchandisers canceled expansion plans. Productive investment capi-
tal flows, including sales of machinery and parts, ground to a halt. The 
trade deficit with Mexico soared to $1.5 billion by March, and the dam-
age was not limited to U.S.-Mexican relations. Investment in "emerg-
ing markets" funds plummeted. Investor confidence in the Argentine 
economy stumbled, and several dozen other countries felt the aftershock. 
LABOR'S RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION 
The turbulence between the U.S. and Mexican economies is a pro-
found reminder that troubles in one country quickly spread to increase 
the vulnerability of workers and communities elsewhere. We are all 
part of one economy and there is no longer a meaningful distinction to 
be made between international and local issues for labor. 
What is happening in Mexico has revealed the power - and the fal-
libility - of global capital mobility. This mobility has been building for 
at least two decades, but the last decade has seen a sudden accelera-
tion, as the communications revolution has made possible electronic 
trading on stock markets around the world. Also possible are the instan-
taneous electronic flows of technology, designs, and market strategies 
throughout the world, without the slightest pause at national boundaries. 
The technological advances would have meant little without the 
international political change that accompanied them. In the past, 
A Sony worker sustained head injuries and was carried away by co-
workers. Two days after Sony workers walked off the job, city police 
arrived in riot gear and began beating the workers. This incident 
and others are being investigated under NAFTA. 
A year and a half after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took 
effect, the rosy picture painted by NAFTA supporters has turned grey. A grow-
ing number of labor activists, researchers, and academics are developing a 
more accurate picture of how NAFTA is affecting our lives. 
DISPUTING OFFICIAL JOB CREATION CLAIMS 
Prior to NAFTA's passage, the administration projected that the U.S. trade 
balance with Mexico would improve, resulting in a net increase of 100,000 U.S. 
jobs during the first year. In fact, official statistics show only 535 NAFTA-related 
jobs were created. When Mexico's exports to the United States grew faster than 
U.S. exports to Mexico, officials stuck to their claim that NAFTA was creating 
U.S. jobs. 
Groups such as the AFL-CIO, the Institute for Policy Studies, and the Economic 
Policy Institute have persistently challenged the administration's claims regard-
ing jobs created by NAFTA. David Ranney, of the University of Illinois, Chicago, 
has also challenged the NAFTA job claims, disputing the administration's argu-
ment that increased exports automatically translate into increased jobs. Through 
case studies of several top exporters, Ranney shows that in today's hi-tech 
factories, companies can increase exports without hiring new employees. 
TRACKING NAFTA-RELATED LAYOFFS 
Labor unions and other researchers have also kept a close eye on the NAFTA 
Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) program, which provides retrain-
ing and other benefits to U.S. workers who lose their jobs as a result of NAFTA. 
As of April, more than 40,000 workers had filed petitions for this assistance, 
and more than 20,000 had been certified. And NAFTA-TAA recipients repre-
sent only a fraction of the workers who have lost their jobs as a result of the 
agreement. Nonetheless, data from this program has been crucial to the mon-
itoring work. The Department of Labor has made available the names, telephone 
numbers, and addresses of NAFTA-TAA recipients and their union representa-
tives to researchers who have used this information to gather and publicize the 
stories of workers and communities suffering the dislocating effects of free trade. 
EVALUATING NAFTA'S LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT 
NAFTA's labor side agreement was designed to help strengthen worker rights 
enforcement in the three NAFTA countries. In September 1994, the U.S. agency 
responsible for handling NAFTA-related labor disputes held its first two hear-
ings, which involved complaints filed by the Teamsters against Honeywell and 
by the United Electrical Workers against General Electric. Both cases concerned 
the firing of Mexican workers for attempting to organize unions at their plants. 
A month after the hearings, the cases were dismissed. 
The International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF) and the 
involved labor unions were highly critical of how the hearings were handled. 
Their harsh assessment of the labor side agreement process was at least par-
tially responsible for improvements in the handling of a third hearing, con-
cerning the Sony Corporation's interference with union reform efforts at a plant 
in Nuevo Laredo. The government investigators agreed to he complainants' demands 
to allow more time for testimony, to hold the hearing closer to the workers' 
homes, and to permit electronic media coverage. The outcome of these hear-
ings was a report from the U.S. National Administrative Office in mid-April 
calling for U.S.-Mexico ministerial consultations and other measures. Minister-
ial consultations in May and June led to some promises of investigation and action 
by the Zedillo government. (See "More NAFTA Complaints, More Labor Lever-
age," page 16.) 
MONITORING WORKER ABUSES IN MEXICO 
The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM), the Southwest Network 
for Environmental and Economic Justice (SNEEJ), the AFL-CIO, and other groups 
have continued to monitor violations of worker rights and health and safety reg-
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nations nurtured local industries by limiting imports through tariffs, and 
states owned industries considered key to a country's economic devel-
opment. National sovereignty severely limited capital's mobility. Today, 
global financial deregulation instituted through international trade 
agreements has changed the landscape for capital. Capitalists have 
spent the past thirty years perfecting their ability to maximize profit 
and minimize risk at everyone else's expense. 
Labor, however, has been slow to develop adequate responses, since 
by definition it is less mobile than capital or technology. While labor 
concentrated on protecting its position in national economies, those 
economies were dissolving into one giant global industrial structure 
linked by fiber-optic communication lines. 
Not long ago, most trade unionists could leave international affairs 
to an obscure bureau at the AFL-CIO and a handful of union officers. 
While everyone pledged allegiance to "international solidarity," in fact, 
international labor activity was considered peripheral to the central task 
of surviving the "Reagan Revolution" at home. Union budgets as well 
as strategies reflected their lack of commitment to international soli-
darity and still do. 
Labor activists did not immediately connect the "Reagan Revolu-
tion" to a global shift. The Reagan agenda reached far beyond U.S. bor-
'Its not my fault! He bumped my arm and then poof...20 billion 
Deutsche marks disappeared into Antarctica!" 
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ders. It was an international agenda instituted through free trade agree-
ments and the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and 
the IMF. The international "Reagan Revolution" took power out of the 
hands of publicly accountable governments and put that power into 
highly centralized but unaccountable private economic forces. 
In keeping with its national perspective, the labor movement initially 
responded to job loss and foreign competition with a "Buy American" 
campaign. Very poignant TV ads still use the slogan to try to stem the 
tide of imported textile goods. While these ads are somewhat effec-
tive, all this strategy buys is a little time, at best. It does nothing to pre-
pare American labor for the world that is emerging, nor to cope with 
the forces that pit U.S. workers against Mexican, Chilean, Indonesian, 
or Chinese workers to the detriment of all. However appealing, this 
strategy is in the end a loser, for it loses valuable time to organize for a 
changing world. 
For better or worse we are part of a global economy and our strate-
gies for the future must take that into account. Whether we are in the 
private sector or public, in agriculture, manufacturing or services, what 
happens to workers in other countries has an immediate impact on our 
Global integration of the 1990s requires that labor 
strategies change, and quickly. 
own job security, and our ability to organize or negotiate meaningful 
contracts. That impact can come from corporate investment decisions, 
terms of a trade agreement, sudden shifts in commodity prices, or the 
conditions of an international development bank loan. But whatever the 
source of that impact, it is quickly felt in the U.S. by a wide range of 
workers and communities. 
The global integration of the 1990s requires that labor strategies 
change, and quickly. For each hesitation leaves labor weaker against its 
primary antagonist, the multinational companies who scour the world 
for maximum leverage against workers and governments. Labor's response 
must include: international as well as domestic labor rights advocacy; 
ratification of ILO conventions as well as domestic labor law reform; 
information sharing among unions in the same company in several 
countries; solidarity with threatened labor activists overseas or near at 
hand; and challenges to transnational companies through communities, 
states, stockholders, and consumers. 
Labor needs to join hands with communities that are buffeted by 
extortionary corporate threats. Labor and environmental groups need 
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to recognize their common interest in broadening international envi-
ronmental and health and safety standards so that evasion of regula-
tion is less of an enticement to corporate flight. Most important, however, 
labor needs to work toward the twin goals of universal labor standards 
that protect the rights of independent unions within the global trad-
ing system, and international collective bargaining. 
INDEPENDENT UNIONS AND UNIVERSAL LABOR STANDARDS 
First, let's consider the question of independent unions. Why target 
this first? Without independent partner unions in the countries where 
multinationals move, we cannot develop an international labor strat-
egy. We discovered this stumbling block during the fight on NAFTA. 
Mexico's largest union federation, the Confederacion del Trabajadores 
Mexicano (CTM) was not sufficiently independent of the government 
to speak with its own voice during the NAFTA debate. Having survived 
and flourished as a part of Mexico's ruling structure, it had become 
dependent on that apparatus and could only echo the Salinas-govern-
ment position. Whatever internal fights the CTM leadership may have 
had within the ruling party, it could not risk its relationship with the 
government by joining forces with the AFL-CIO or the Canadian Labor 
Congress. 
Some in Mexico thought this lack of international solidarity was due 
to irreconcilable differences between U.S. and Mexican labor's needs. 
They argued that Mexican workers had to preserve their cheap wage "com-
parative advantage" in order to benefit from the trade agreement. How-
ever, the small independent unions allied with the non-government-related 
Frente Autentico del Trabajo (FAT) took a different stance. FAT rejected 
the notion that Mexico's comparative advantage of low labor costs 
should be preserved by nonenforcement of labor law. The independent 
Mexican unions worked with labor and other civic organizations in the 
U.S. and Canada. By doing so, they helped the U.S. labor movement 
take an approach to trade that was international in perspective, rather 
than one focused solely on questions of national interest. We were all 
stronger for it. 
Preserving and strengthening independent trade unions must be our 
top international priority. Setting international labor standards that 
protect independent union autonomy and free associational rights is an 
important part of an international labor agenda. (See the article, "...And 
the Twain Shall Meet?," p. 51, for an in-depth discussion of interna-
tional labor standards.) 
In addition to pressing for the inclusion of labor standards in inter-
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national trade agreements, the labor movement should support other 
policy proposals currently before Congress. For example, there is a bill 
now pending before Congress that would enforce a corporate code for 
the overseas operations and contracts of companies that receive gov-
ernment contracts or export services. Bills barring the import of goods 
made by exploited child labor have been introduced in both the House 
and Senate annually for the past five years, without action by the pow-
erful Trade Subcommittees, and without commitment to their passage 
by either the Bush or Clinton administrations. 
Development Banks 
The Mexican disaster, long in coming, was essentially the product of 
policies forced on that country by the IMF and the World Bank since 
1982. Mexico is not alone in feeling these pressures, the impact of which 
has been devastating for the labor movement in many countries. In 
much of Africa and Latin America, the trade union movement was 
strongest in precisely those areas of the public sector targeted for pri-
vatization. In most instances, privatization has meant the dismantling 
of trade unions, the loss of collective agreements, and the "flexibiliza-
tion" of the workforce. (See the article, "Privatization Bites," p. 77.) 
The IMF and World Bank continue to push governments to gut their 
labor laws and privatize their state sector companies. Last summer, 
however, the U.S. Congress passed a law which requires the U.S. rep-
resentative at these institutions to use voice and vote to advocate for a 
reversal of these policies, and to screen all projects to make certain they 
were not undermining the basic rights of workers. For this law to be effec-
tive, the trade union movement needs to actively provide information 
and analysis to the U.S. executive directors of the banks about the 
impact of structural adjustment loans on various countries' work forces. 
Then, it needs to monitor the government's use of this information 
and hold it to faithful enforcement of the law. Such a process is not easy, 
but in terms of affecting the labor rights of workers around the world, 
it may be one of the most important ways to work. 
Labor Solidarity 
Policy work - getting and enforcing laws that link international eco-
nomic activity to protection of international labor rights - is a neces-
sary start. However, without strong actions of labor solidarity among free 
unions, it won't result in many gains for workers, either at home or over-
seas. 
One important solidarity action is cross-border organizing. Other 
articles in this issue detail efforts at cross-border organizing, whether 
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by Mexican unions providing assistance to workers in Wisconsin or U.S. 
unions helping Colombian mine workers. These efforts are relatively new 
for U.S. unions (although Samuel Gompers was said to have learned 
much from his counterparts who were active in the Mexican revolution). 
Other cross-border efforts are underway in other parts of the world. 
The AFL-CIO's Asian American Free Labor Institute has given crucial 
assistance to women garment workers in Bangladesh. Last December 
these workers formally inaugurated the first independent, women-led 
autonomous labor union in that country's history. Dutch unions are 
also providing help for a very beleaguered attempt to organize a non-gov-
ernment-run union in Indonesia. Canadian unions have a long history 
of solidarity and assistance to unions in Latin America - often to unions 
in countries where U.S. trade union presence was caught up in Cold 
War politics, such as Nicaragua, Chile, Cuba, and El Salvador. 
Global companies are vulnerable to labor pressure on a 
scale never seen before - but the global labor movement 
must get itself coordinated to exert that pressure. 
Individual plant-level solidarity actions have also been important. 
Earlier this spring the Kirkwood Company in Mexico City, an auto parts 
firm that moved much of its operation to Mexico, attempted to force 
its workers to accept a pro-company union rather than choose repre-
sentation by a FAT-related union. When workers resisted they were 
fired. Workers from Kirkwood's Cleveland plant went to Mexico City 
to strategize with the embattled union leaders about the company, 
using their experience to help their brothers and sisters cope. 
Similarly, for several years the U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Pro-
ject has worked in Guatemala with garment and coffee plantation work-
ers to strengthen their communication and contacts outside the country, 
as well as to collaborate with them in the filing of petitions in the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program and to bring labor 
delegations from the same companies in the states to meet with them. 
These cross-border contacts have strengthened labor solidarity on both 
sides. 
Efforts are underway, however, to limit labor's international solidar-
ity actions as evidenced by the last decision rendered by the Bush admin-
istration's National Labor Relations Board against the International 
Longshoreman's Association (ILA). At the request of the ILA, the Japan-
ese longshoreman's union announced its intention to refuse to off load 
cargo from a port under dispute in an organizing battle. But, the National 
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Labor Relations Board found that the ILA violated secondary boycott 
restrictions by pursuing this campaign and slapped the union with mil-
lions of dollars in damages. This decision is an outrageous attempt to 
apply U.S. law to activities which are legal in Japan and undertaken by 
an independent Japanese entity. The ruling has just been overturned 
by the U.S. Appeals Court in Washington, D.C. and sent back to the 
NLRB for reconsideration. The case, however it is decided, demon-
strates the extent of corporate America's fear of international labor sol-
idarity. 
Joint Collective Bargaining 
Moving from solidarity and support to joint action has proved more 
difficult. Negotiations in different countries take place with different 
rhythms, in conjunction with different political or corporate timeta-
bles. Some initial steps are underway, as various international trade 
union secretariats (ITSs) sponsor global consultations of workers belong-
ing to the same multinational, such as Nestle or Unilever. Fact-shar-
ing, comparing of collective agreements and negotiating strategies, and 
sharing company data across national lines are useful first steps. But before 
long we anticipate that unions will discover internationally what U.S. 
unions are finding domestically: negotiating with plants that are mak-
ing key components for assembly in other countries can be much more 
effective than targeting assembly plants or autonomous operations. 
Forty percent of all international trade consists of intra-company 
transfers from one unit of a company to another in a different country. 
This form of global integration means that a few corporations are pow-
erful on a scale never seen before. It also means that global companies 
are vulnerable to labor pressures on a larger scale than ever before - but 
the global labor movement must get itself coordinated to exert that 
pressure. 
The struggle for justice for working people is global. Labor strategies 
which ignore that reality will not succeed in doing more than buying 
small amounts of time. If labor wants to construct the future, rather 
than simply react to it, it will have to move aggressively on a global 
scale. Time is not on its side. Achievement of international labor stan-
dards that are a part of the rules of trade and finance is a critical start. 
Coordinating the use of these standards with international negotiating 
strategies will turn around the race to the bottom we are currently expe-
riencing. We can infuse the brave new world of high-tech global eco-
nomic integration with justice and equity. • 
